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The conﬂ ict of 2001 in the Republic of Macedonia between Albanian uprisers 
of the NLA (National Liberation Army) and the Macedonian police and army 
contains all proportions of theoretical and scientiﬁ c interpretation with respect 
to political juridical terminology, veriﬁ ed scientiﬁ c terms for similar usage in 
objective circumstances. Confusion in the interpretation of the 2001 conﬂ ict also 
derives from disrespect for political juridical terminology and objective reality of 
subjective events. This confusion ocurs in scientiﬁ c surroundings in Macedonia 
and as such continues to “function” within mass communication as well. This 
paper aims to provide a more real and objective image in the interpretation of 
the conﬂ ict in 2001, by emphasizing disrespect for political termoinoligy by the 
actors of the 2001 events. 
Key words: conﬂ ict (violent - non-violent), conﬂ ict as a process, political system, 
war, crisis, violence, ethnic conﬂ ict, extremism, uprising
INTRODUCTION
The conﬂ ict of 2001 in the Republic of Macedonia between Albanian upri-
sers of the NLA (National Liberation Army) and the Macedonian police and 
army contains all proportions of theoretical and scientiﬁ c interpretation with 
respect to political juridical terminology, veriﬁ ed scientiﬁ c terms for similar 
usage in objective circumstances. 
*  Ymer Ismaili, Ph. D., Associate professor, South East European University Tetovo, Ilin-
denska p.n., 1200 Tetovo
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Confusion in the interpretation of the 2001 conﬂ ict also derives from disrespect 
for political juridical terminology and objective reality of subjective events.
This confusion occurs in scientiﬁ c surroundings in Macedonia and as such 
continues to “function” within mass communication as well.
This paper aims to provide a more real and objective image in the interpreta-
tion of the conﬂ ict in 2001, by emphasizing disrespect for political terminology 
by the actors of the 2001 events.
There are many attempts to deﬁ ne the notion of conﬂ ict. Taking into consi-
deration the frequent use of the term in many social sciences such as economics, 
sociology, social psychology, political science, etc., the existence of different 
methodological approaches to deﬁ ne the notion of conﬂ ict is common. In reality, 
by trying to deﬁ ne the notion of conﬂ ict, we encounter a conﬂ ict1 situation. 
However, we will indicate some of the notions to deﬁ ne the term. 
Some authors deﬁ ne conﬂ ict as a form of interaction where the subject 
attempting to fulﬁ ll its personal interests by its actions makes it impossible 
for the other subject to fulﬁ ll its interests or, on the other hand, by its actions 
wishes to destroy the other subject.2 
Peaceful Research Centers3 distinguish two different beliefs on the notion 
of conﬂ ict. The ﬁ rst one begins by perceiving A and B like actors who have 
conscious purposes, and the conﬂ ict takes place only - and to the point - when 
the needs fulﬁ llment of A deprives B of fulﬁ lling its needs. 
According to the second belief, instead of conscious purposes, between the 
actors A and B there are objective interests, independent of the individual 
state of the brain and the conﬂ ict derives from interrelations of objective in-
terests that are often built as systems. 
Marxist tradition with the working theory of values sees the objective interest 
as the interest of the class in the control of the added value. Other traditions 
focus on national interest rather than the interest of classes.4 
1 Bonacker, Thorsten/Imbusch, Peter (2005), “Zentrale Begriffe der Friedens-und Kon-
ﬂ iktforschung: Konﬂ ikt, Gewalt, Krieg, Frieden”, in Peter Imbusch/Ralf Zoll (eds.), Frie-
dens-und Konﬂ iktforschung. Eine Einfuhrung, Wiesbaden, p. 6.
2 Enciklopedija politiËke kulture (1993), grupa autora, Savremena administracija, str. 
513-514.
3 IPRA Studies in Peace Research, (1970), Proceedings of the International Peace Re-
search Association Third Conference, Vol. 1: Philosophy of Peace Research, Assen: van 
Gorcum.
4 Frankel, Joseph, (1970), National Interest, London: Macmillan.
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This can be perceived in many ways. Some of them deal with the intention 
of individual decision carriers or they are a result of negotiations between dif-
ferent decision carriers. On the other hand, others perceive national interest as 
long-term intention which surpasses governments, such as geographic, strategic 
or economic factors. Other deﬁ nitions supported by interest focus on natural 
rights, basic needs and living conditions5. 
Heidelberg’s institute for international research on conﬂ icts6 deﬁ nes conﬂ ict 
as the war of interests (differences in positions) at the national level with a 
deﬁ ned longitude and magnitude between at least two sides (organized groups, 
states, group states, organizations) who are determined to go through with their 
interests and win the case. 
The Correlates-of-War-Project initiated by Singer & Small, deﬁ nes conﬂ ict 
as violent behavior where at least one of the sides involves the state and there 
are at least 100 victims in the battle7. Among quantitative-empirical deﬁ nitions 
there is also Stockholm International Peace8 telling that armed conﬂ ict is deﬁ ned 
as a need of force between armed forces of two or more governments, or one 
state and at least one armed organized group, resulting in at least 1000 dead 
each calendar year and where incompatibility deals with the control of power 
or territory.  
Conﬂ ict deﬁ nition given by the Upsala Conﬂ ict Database (USPD)9 deﬁ nes 
armed conﬂ ict like: racing incompatibility related to power or territory or both, 
where the use of armed forces between both sides results in at least 25 war 
victims. One of these two sides has to be the Government of the state. 
 
5 Galtung, Johan, (1971), “A Structural Theory of Imperialism”, Journal of Peace Research 
8:2, pp. 81-117.
6 HIIK (2005), “Conﬂ ict barometer”,Heidelberg,http://www.rzuser.uniheidelberg.de/~Ischeith 
/CoBa05.pdf
7 Singer, D. Joel/Small, Melvin (1972), “The Wages of War 1816-1965, A statistical hand-
book”, New York, p. 8.
8 Dwan, Renata/Holmqvist, Caroline (n.d), “Patterns of major armed conﬂ icts”, Stock-
holm, http:/www.sipri.org/contents/conﬂ ict/MAC patterns.html
9 Wallensteen, Peter/Sollenberg, Margareta (2005), “Armed conﬂ ict and its international 
dimensions, 1946-2004”, in Journal of Peace Research, 42/5, pp.6 23-635.
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1. KINDS OF CONFLICTS 
There are a great number of divisions of social conﬂ icts. Among others, as 
criteria for typology are used: the kind of the social group participant in the 
conﬂ ict, circumstances of the conﬂ ict seen as alternative means to reach the 
goal, articulation ways of incompatible interests of the sides, force use, dyna-
mics of conﬂ ict escalation etc.
Based on this criterion, conﬂ icts are divided into class conﬂ icts, national 
conﬂ icts, racial conﬂ icts and religious conﬂ icts. Since social classes are enga-
ged in competitive productive rapports, conﬂ ict of the production system is 
classiﬁ ed as class conﬂ ict. 
Also, national, racial and religious groups can be represented as conﬂ ict 
subjects. There is a difference between class conﬂ icts and conﬂ icts that have 
as sides other social groups. The difference derives from radicalization of the 
purpose for which the conﬂ ict is taking place. Class conﬂ icts very often attempt 
towards radical change of a given political system, through change of the ways 
of production and consumption. 
On the other hand, conﬂ icts of other social groups contest a given political 
system by wanting to change some parts of it, or by refusing the acceptance 
of the system’s rules, or by presenting demands for forming personal political 
units (states) that in a socio-economic perspective do not differ from the pre-
vious10. Many authors assess that different language and cultural tradition of 
religious and racial groups who live within the same society stress the possibi-
lity of a social conﬂ ict escalation in the sense of higher intensity of insolence 
and change of its nature. This would cause it to develop from a real conﬂ ict 
into an unreal one, the purpose of which will later become destruction of the 
social group itself.11 
Robert Dahl12 assesses the ways of reaching tolerance among racial, national 
and religious conﬂ icts, i.e. obstacles to their escalation: 
1. if ethnic, religious and racial subcultures are not denied participation in 
power; 
10 Enciklopedija politiËke kulture (1993), grupa autora, Savremena administracija, str. 
517.
11 Ibid.
12 Dahl, Robert (1967), Democracy in the United States, Conﬂ ict and consent, Rand Mc 
Nelly, Chicago, p. 239.
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2. if there is agreement within society (it does not necessarily have to be coded) 
which ensures security of different subcultures;
3. if people within the country believe that the system ( polyarchy ) can re-
spond to the country’s needs.
Based on this criterion, conﬂ icts are divided into retained and systemic 
conﬂ icts. In the ﬁ rst case, the subjects of social conﬂ ict contest the basis of the 
socio-political system. On the other hand, systemic conﬂ icts deal with interests 
which are the essence of the conﬂ ict and in concordance with the basic princi-
ples of this system. Based on this classiﬁ cation, many authors divide political 
parties into retained and anti-systemic ones. 
The anti-systemic parties include those parties whose political doctrines 
ﬁ ght against the representative democratic system and demand its radical 
transformation, including here communist parties. The second group (retained) 
includes parties that support representative democracy and demand only small 
changes within the social system. 
The ﬁ rst group is believed to have negative inﬂ uence, while retained parties 
are believed to have positive inﬂ uence on the socio-political sphere. However, 
even if we accept the strict division of political parties into anti-systemic and 
retained ones, their black and white signiﬁ cance (one is seen as a negative 
phenomenon and the other as a positive one) raises skepticism. George Lavol13 
assesses that anti-systemic parties have a tribune function, i.e. a protective fun-
ction of the interest of a certain social group which puts society in a bad angle. 
Such is the case of communist parties which protect the interest of the working 
class in capitalist societies. According to Lavol, the existence of these parties is 
necessary, because although they impede the harmonic function of the system, 
they serve as a security ventil, since they diminish the chances of a revolution. 
As such they guard representative democracy. From here derives Lavol’s view of 
anti-systemic parties being negative for the socio-political order. 
1.1. Is conﬂ ict an alternative means in the accomplishment of some 
purposes? 
Researchers often use Koser’s14 classiﬁ cation of conﬂ icts: real and unreal.
According to Koser, we talk about real conﬂ ict when the purpose is ﬁ xed, 
and functional alternatives exist. What does this mean? In this case the con-
13 Enciklopedija politiËke kulture (1993), grupa autora, Savremena administracija, str. 518.
14 Ibid.
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ﬂ ict is a result of opposite purposes of both sides (social groups) in relation to 
the determined good (right, interest, etc). The real conﬂ ict, says Koser, does 
not have to have psychological tensions and reciprocal resentment, although 
resentment can be functional because it pushes participants to intensively 
engage in the conﬂ ict. 
Unreal conﬂ icts, on the other hand, are not based on determined purposes 
and rivalry of the sides in conﬂ ict regarding the determined purposes. They are 
based, according to Koser, on the need to realize tensions of at least one of them. 
Reasons for this conﬂ ict are enemy impulses and aggressiveness, while the object 
is of secondary importance and might even change during the conﬂ ict. 
Regulating unreal conﬂ icts is much harder than regulating real ones. To 
effectively impede unreal conﬂ icts, there is a need to divest of unreal elements, 
such as resentment and aggressiveness, until we get to the real reason of the 
conﬂ ict, if there is one. Koser acknowledges that these kinds of conﬂ icts cannot 
be found as pure. 
2. CONFLICT AS A PROCESS
Based on the Mesmer (2003) concept of conﬂ ict, Diez Seter and Albert15 
view incompatibility between two sides and the ways they regulate it as speciﬁ c 
basic standards and, based on this, they have elaborated the 4-degree typology 
of conﬂ ict: 
- conﬂ ict episode - when there is incompatible articulation related to a real 
problem; 
- thematic conﬂ icts - when there is explicit disagreement and moves of one 
side are interpreted as hostile by the other side; 
- forced conﬂ icts - when communicative disagreement is not only ordered 
but there are forms of subordination, abidance and possible extermination 
of the other. 
The typology of COSIM 16 on the meaning of conﬂ ict as a dynamic process 
developed by Pfetsch17 gives the following conﬂ ict classiﬁ cation: 
15 Diez, Thomas/Setter Stephan/Albert, Mathias (2004), “The European Union and the 
transformation of border conﬂ icts: theorizing the impact of integration and association 
(EU Border Conf-Working paper 1)”, Liverpool.
16 HIIK(2005),”Conﬂ ictbarometer”, Heidelberg,http://www.rzuser.uniheidelberg.de/~Ischeith/ 
CoBa05.pdf
17 Pfetsch, Frank R. (1994), “Internationale Politik”, Stuttgart, p. 216.
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-  Latent conﬂ ict - the distinguished position compared to the determined 
value of national importance is estimated as a latent conﬂ ict if adequate 
demands of one side are articulated and seen as such by the other side. 
- Manifested conﬂ ict - this conﬂ ict includes the use of certain measures such 
as verbal pressure, violence threats or imposition of economic sanctions; 
the crises-tensed situation where at least one side uses violence in sporadic 
incidents.
- Harsh crises - when violence is rapid and organized. 
- War - a kind of violent conﬂ ict where forced violence is organized, used 
continually and systematically. Sides in conﬂ ict undertake extensive measures 
depending on the situation; destruction is extended and massive. 
2.1. Usage of violence
Based on the last typology, where conﬂ ict is viewed as a process and an 
adequate kind of phenomena, another division that views conﬂ ict as violent 
or non-violent derives. 
Before we elaborate deﬁ nitions of violent and non-violent conﬂ icts, we 
will clarify all types of violence and show that violence is the root of the pro-
blem. However, this does not mean it has to be manifested as direct physical 
violence. 
According to the famous theory of Johan Galtung18 there are three basic 
forms by which violence is manifested. The ﬁ rst one is direct violence, easily 
measurable and visible. This is physical violence of armed groups, threatening 
people’s lives and material goods. The greatest attempts to manage direct vio-
lence try to stop, repress and ﬁ nd solutions by responding violently or through 
political means. 
The second type of violence is structural violence, which is invisible and 
deeply rooted in social, juridical and political systems. This is manifested 
through social injustice or other (ethnic) discrimination, suppressing human 
rights, etc. Actually, structural violence is essential to conﬂ ict presentation; it 
is a source of conﬂ icting behavior. Managing structural violence is a strenuous 
work that requires will, understanding, patience and means. Social restructuring 
18 Galtung, Johan (2000), Conﬂ ict Transformation by Peaceful Means (The Transcendent 
Method), New York UN, p. 104.
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is a radical intervention, and according to many theories, peaceful reforms often 
result only in imposed institutional designs, legal reforms, political agreements 
and similar solutions that do not get to the essence of structural violence. 
 The third kind of violence according to Galtung, is cultural violence, 
where society or part of the society ﬁ nds easy means to legitimize violence, by 
interpreting it as patriotism, sacriﬁ ce, heroism, etc., and ﬁ nds expressive means 
in public discussion, media, symbols, education, etc. 
The theory of peace and conﬂ icts distinguishes negative and positive peace. 
Such distinction derives from the elaboration of Galtung’s types of violence. 
When society lives in negative peace conditions, direct violence is missing, 
while structural and cultural violence although invisible are present, and they 
are manifested through dissatisfaction or the existing tensions within society. 
Positive peace, on the other hand, represents the integral strategy of confron-
tation with all forms of violence, with priority in areas where it is built and 
turned into norms within society. 
2.2. Non-violent and violent conﬂ icts
After elaborating types of violence and kinds of peace which depend respec-
tively on the presence or absence of violence, we can refer to conﬂ ict division as 
violent and non-violent. It needs to be emphasized that for the purpose of this 
paper violence will be referred to as direct and respectively physical. Sandole19 
deﬁ nes non-violent conﬂ ict as a process of manifested conﬂ ict. In this conﬂ ict 
sides and their representatives attempt to follow their perception of incompa-
tible purposes by direct or indirect destruction of their skills. In other words, 
one side tries to impede the other side in order to follow its purposes. 
According to the above-mentioned typology20 of COSIMO there are two 
kinds of non-violent conﬂ icts: latent and manifested conﬂ icts. Latent conﬂ ict, in 
the use of a force prism, is deﬁ ned as a stage in conﬂ ict development where one 
or more groups, sides or states question the existing values of national relevance. 
19 Sandole, Dennis (1998), “A comprehensive mapping of conﬂ ict and conﬂ ict resolution: 
on a three pillar approach”, in Peace and Conﬂ ict Studies, 5/2.
20 HIIK (2005), “Conﬂ ict barometer”, Heidelberg, http://www.rzuser.uni-heidelberg.de/
~Ischeith/CoBa05.pdf
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In this connection, latent conﬂ ict naturally must have signs to be identiﬁ ed and 
observed in order to note the existence of such conﬂ ict. Position differences in 
latent conﬂ ict are articulated through demands of an unsatisﬁ ed side. 
Manifested conﬂ ict is a stage where tensions are present but expressed 
through means outside of the violence limits. Such tensed relation between 
sides can deter to the point where usage of force will be the best option. 
When differences and incompatible interests of the sides in conﬂ ict cannot 
be attained through peaceful means and when usage of force and violence has 
become a means of accomplishing demands, then the conﬂ ict becomes vio-
lent. For Davies21 the presence of existentialist frustrations (physical, social, 
self-actualized) or implementing needs (safety, knowledge and force) is a basic 
condition under which a non-violent conﬂ ict becomes a violent one. Violence 
is generated as a response to frustrated borne needs or demands. 
Political analysis of conﬂ ict sees the usage of force, physical hazard, and 
human victims as characteristics of a violent conﬂ ict. Human victims in a 
battleﬁ eld are the ﬁ rst indication to deﬁ ne a violent conﬂ ict, especially war. 
The manifested aggressive process of conﬂ ict is the term used by Sandole22 
to deﬁ ne violent conﬂ ict as a “situation where sides and their representatives 
attempt to follow their perception of incompatible purposes by physical hazard 
or destruction of property and symbols of a high value for one side (e.g. reli-
gious objects, national statues, etc.) and /or psychological and physical harm, 
distraction or attempts to eliminate one side. 
Dan Smith,23 by analyzing trends and reasons of violent conﬂ ict, uses the 
term armed conﬂ ict when he refers to violent behavior and deﬁ nes it as “open 
armed conﬂ ict between two or more sides centrally organized, with continuity 
of conﬂ ict related to control of power and territory.” 
UCDP classiﬁ es military conﬂ icts into these three stages: 
- minor armed conﬂ ict - at least 25 victims on the battleﬁ eld a year and 
less than 1000 victims during the whole conﬂ ict; 
21 Davies, Morton (1973), “Aggression, Violence, Revolution and War”, in Jeanne N. Knut-
son (ed.), Handbook of Political Psychology, San Francisco, p. 251.
22 Sandole, Dennis (1998), “A comprehensive mapping of conﬂ ict and conﬂ ict resolution: 
on a three pillar approach”, in Peace and Conﬂ ict Studies, 5/2.
23 Smith, Dan (2005), “Trends and causes of armed conﬂ ict” in David Bloomfeld/Martina 
Ficher/Beatrix Schmelze (eds), Beghof handbook for conﬂ ict transformation, Berlin.
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- intermediate armed conﬂ ict - at least 25 victims on the battleﬁ eld a year 
and less than 1000 victims during the whole conﬂ ict, but with the condition 
to be less than 1000 a year;
- war - at least 1000 victims on the battleﬁ eld a year.
In relation to the COSIMO classiﬁ cation harsh crisis is the second in the 
category of violent crisis, after crisis. Harsh crisis has a higher intensity of 
force use, not sporadic and by accident but better organized. The use of force 
becomes characteristic of conﬂ ict. The highest form of violent conﬂ ict is war. 
In this classiﬁ cation difference between harsh crisis and war is not the number 
of victims, but the way force is used, whether it is organized or not. 
The moment it appears, conﬂ ict has its own trajectory, its own phases that 
need to be mentioned. It is not necessary that these phases follow each other 
or for all of them to happen. Theories of conﬂ ict distinguish many dynamic 





The classical model appears reduced compared to broader models offered 
by Alker, Gurr and Rupsinge.24 They distinguish 6 phases:
The ﬁ rst phase, the contest phase, is characterized by opposite approaches 
of sides expressed through institutionalized forms and processes. 
In the second phase, the crisis phase, the opposition still uses institutional 
processes, but the use of violence is possible and to be expected. 
The phase of deﬁ ned violence follows when legitimacy and usefulness of 
the institutional process is questioned, i.e. the opposition assesses that the 
systematic and regulated use of force is rational. 
However, when the use of regular, systematic and uncontrolled force is the 
way by which the opposition seeks to fulﬁ ll its purposes and when institutional 
processes for peaceful solution of the conﬂ ict are impossible, then the conﬂ ict 
is entering its fourth stage, the mass conﬂ ict. 
The ﬁ fth phase is conﬂ ict diminishment where the actions of actors are 
heading towards temporary suspension of violence. 
24 Alker, Hayward R., Gurr, Robert Ted and Rupesinghe, Kumar (2001) (eds.), “Journeys 
through conﬂ ict. Narratives and lessons”, Lanham. 
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The sixth phase is conﬂ ict resolution, with a declaration of demands by 
the unsatisﬁ ed party and the establishment of new institutional processes or 
reestablishment of the accepted common processes.
To the contrary, Braham25 has developed a 7-phase trajectory of conﬂ ict. 
According to him, conﬂ ict starts when there is a latent conﬂ ict, followed by 
the presentation phase, and then by the conﬂ ict escalation that reaches the 
highest point of conﬂ ict heat, later followed by negotiations phases, contest 
solution and post-conﬂ icting peace building. 
Brieﬂ y, these are the basic stations where the conﬂ ict trajectory passes. Once 
more it needs to be emphasized that it is not necessary that the conﬂ ict goes 
through all these phases and they do not have to follow each other.
2.3. Purposes, interests, values
Finally, in our theory elaboration we have encountered many terms related 
to the motives of conﬂ icting behavior. Purposes, interests, values, rights, etc. 
are the most common conﬂ ict themes, the reason why conﬂ icts happen. 
Interests are the most important components of social conﬂ ict and social 
groups, which undertake actions for their achievement. Interests according 
to Jurgen Habermas are basic orientations, related to determined conditions, 
fundamental to reproduction and possible constitution of humankind, meaning 
these orientations are related to work and interaction. For this reason, adds 
Habermas, orientations are not directed towards direct fulﬁ llment of empirical 
needs, but the solution of system problems in general. This elaboration does 
not allow complex social interests to behave in some or one dimension (pure 
economic reduction) and on the other hand emphasises subjective dimensions 
of social groups. In other words, different social groups range differently their 
interests on their priority list.
Regarding interests as a conﬂ ict motive, we also need to mention deﬁ nitions 
of national interest, which can be conceptualized in many ways, elaborated on 
the ﬁ rst page of this paper26. Some of them deal with purposes of individual 
decision carriers or they are the result of negotiations between different deci-
25 Brahm, Eric (2003), “Conﬂ ict Stages”, in Guy Burgess/Heidi Burgess (eds.), Beyond 
intractability, Boulder.
26 Frankel, Joseph (1970), “National Interest”, Macmillan, London.
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sion carriers. On the other hand, national interest is constructed as a long-term 
goal exceeding governments and regimes and it is determined by geographical, 
strategic or economic factors. Other deﬁ nitions supported by interests focus 
on natural rights, basic needs and living conditions.27
Territory, ideology, legitimacy of dynasty, religion, language, ethnos, self-
-deﬁ ning, natural sources, markets, domination, equality and revenge according 
to Singer28 are the main suspects in conﬂ icting behavior. We will focus only 
on minority and ethnic conﬂ icts, taking into consideration the speciﬁ cs of the 
subject we are elaborating. Speciﬁ cally, we will focus on the events that took 
place in Macedonia during the year 2001. 
3. MINORITY AND ETHNIC CONFLICTS: CONFLICT 
MANAGEMENT 
 
There is no equality between minority and ethnic conﬂ icts. Although in 
most cases minority conﬂ icts translate into ethnic ones, seeing them as equal 
is wrong. Minority conﬂ ict does not a priori mean ethnic conﬂ ict. Minority 
groups may have different identity speciﬁ cations. For example, we can refer to 
as a minority group when we talk about the social minority of homosexuals, a 
speciﬁ c social structure. 
Most update reports dealing with conﬂ ict, prepared by prominent research 
centers (Carnegie, Woodrow Wilson) advise that ethnic-minority conﬂ icts 
are dominant at the state and international level. Based on Beker’s argument, 
cited by Szarka29, minority conﬂ icts emerge when the majority or dominant 
national power wishes to set the same conditions in the same region where 
the majority is comprised by the minority group, also in other regions within 
the state. Beker assumes the ability of minority groups for political action and 
elaboration of their speciﬁ c demands such as cultural, educational and self-go-
27 Galtung, Johan (1971), “A Structural Theory of Imperialism”, Journal of Peace Research 
8:2, pp. 81-117.
28 Singer, D. Joel (1996), “Armed conﬂ ict in the former colonial regions: from classiﬁ cation 
to explanation”, in Luc van de Goor/Kumar Rupesinghe/Paul Sciarone (eds.), Between 
development and destruction: an enquiry into the causes of conﬂ ict in post-colonial 
states”, pp. 35-49.
29 Szarka, Lazlo (1998), “Three minority groups through western eyes” in The Hungarian 
Quartely”, 39/150.
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verning demands. Based on these assumptions, Beker deﬁ nes minority conﬂ ict 
as a “form of active antagonism, between power (the state) and representatives 
of the minority group, regarding the possibility of the minority to inﬂ uence the 
use and organization of the territory (sub-state), inhabited by them.”
Fearon30 admits that ethnic conﬂ icts have a separatist incentive, as a con-
sequence of the fear of the minority group that the state system run by the 
majority will be misused towards minority rights. Hechter31 and Posen32 assess 
that ethnic conﬂ icts start as a result of insecurity feelings; when an ethnic group 
is not sure about the other group’s intentions, and both behave like enemies. 
Other theories assess that political elites create ethnic conﬂ icts, manipulating 
with ethnic identities in their war for power. 
Conﬂ ict management brings in a third side to the quality of the mediator, 
conﬂ ict advisor, conﬂ ict manager or supervisor, called in to help; or by self-ini-
tiative offers to manage the conﬂ ict. Experience has shown that both opposite 
sides have managed to resolve the conﬂ ict on their own. 
Keneth Boulding33 proposes a three-fold typology to conﬂ ict regulation:
1. sides in conﬂ ict separate from each other; 
2. invasion, when one side has total power over the other side; 
3. procedural regulation of conﬂ ict: 
• reconciliation - convergence of value systems and elimination of the 
conﬂ ict step by step;
• compromise - there is no common value system, but opponent sides are 
prepared to give up on their main goals in order to regulate the conﬂ ict;
• arbitrage - by the subject not involved in the conﬂ ict. 
Boulding’s typology represents the ideal classiﬁ cation, which in practice is 
rarely used purely as such. Often, a combination of many strategies is used for 
conﬂ ict regulation.
30 Fearon, D.James (1994), “Ethnic war as a commitment problem (Paper presented at the 
annual meeting of the American Political Science Association)”, New York.
31 Hechter, Michael (1995), “Explaining nationalist violence” in Nations and Nationalism, 
1/1, pp. 53-68.
32 Posen, Barry (1993), “The security dilemma and etnic conﬂ ict”, in Survival, 35/1, pp. 
27-47.
33 Boulding, Keneth, “Conﬂ ict and Defense”, A General Theory, Harper Torchbooks, New 
York, pp. 306-311.
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Conﬂ ict management is composed of many elements. The ﬁ rst one is conﬂ ict 
regulation, where activities are directed only towards a direct impediment, 
where the third side attempts through different strategies to facilitate game 
transformation x/o and as a consequence to end the conﬂ ict by achieving po-
litical understanding. (Bercovitch34, Zartman35).
The second form is conﬂ ict resolution. This management type does not 
assume only ending direct violence, but tries to ﬁ nd ways to fulﬁ ll universal 
human needs such as security, justice and acceptance. (Burton 1990). Burton 
proposes to transform conﬂ ict into an acceptable situation for both sides 
through workshops, discussion groups, or round tables (methods) and through 
mediation, negotiation and arbitrage (procedures). The need to improve com-
munication among sides in conﬂ ict in order to have mutual understanding of 
interests of each side is fundamental for Burton. Crucial for both sides is to 
understand that human needs are not limited recourses and through negotia-
tions, the wining situation / winning results can be achieved. 
The third form of conﬂ ict management is conﬂ ict transformation. Actually, 
according to Galtung (2001) each conﬂ ict solution is more or less a temporary 
one. At one time, a certain solution may bring peace and prosperity, while oppo-
nent interests may emerge again or have new ones. The conﬂ ict transformation 
model is based on the fact that determined transforming capacities may and 
must be present at the sides involved in the conﬂ ict. By this, people’s skills for 
mutual respect are accepted, as well as reciprocal understanding, which will lead 
both sides towards a stable and acceptable solution. (Berndt/ Speck 2000, Blasi 
2001) We will introduce the transformation model of Johan Galtung.
According to Galtung, conﬂ ict transformation is possible before violence 
initiates, during violence and after violence comes to an end. As we can see in 
the graph below, the TRANSCEDENT model deals with conﬂ ict transformation 
and relevance of A.Q 3 R - reconstruction, reconciliation, and resolution.
34 Bercovitch, Jakob (1984), “Social conﬁ ct and third parties. Strategies of conﬂ ict resolu-
tion”, Boulder
35 Zartman, Ira William (1985), “Ripe for resolution. Conﬂ ict and intervention in Africa”, 
New York
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Source: Galtung, Johan (2005), Conﬂ ict Transformation by Peaceful Means (The Transcend 
Method).
The analysis of the theoretical basis of the conﬂ ict notion is used in order 
to observe that conﬂ ict is not only an eloquent journalistic or political means. 
Conﬂ ict in its essence is a profound psychological, political and economical 
and irenologic means. Based on the theoretical background of the notion, im-
provisation and irresponsible use, often naive, would be avoided. 
Actually, ignorance of the theoretical fundaments of the conﬂ ict in Mace-
donia in 2001 is a classical example of caused disagreements that crystallize 
in the glass space of the media in Macedonia. 
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Denis Mcquail36 emphasizes that the dynamics of the media can be under-
stood as a broad principle, and the mass media can act through three ways: by 
reﬂ ecting differences in society (dynamics as reﬂ ection), by presenting different 
approaches to differentt points of view of the world (dynamics as approach), 
and by presenting a broad spectrum of solutions (dynamics as solution). 
The media dynamics is seen by Jurgen Habermas37 as a social sphere where 
information and common interest development take place and where public 
opinion is formed. This public opinion in Macedonia sharpened the political will 
in the media space and revealed the dualism of Macedonian society. Actually, 
it introduced this dynamics as a democracy achievement, but politicians and 
journalists remained inside their ideological shell. 
Journalistic comments launched a great number of terminology molecules 
which clouded simple citizens’ point of view. Terminology of the media contained 
terms such as: war, foreign aggression, civil war, terrorism, national war, extre-
mism, etc. All these terms, in regard to scientiﬁ c validity, do not have any point 
of reference with what happened in Macedonia in 2001. Macedonia experienced 
a conﬂ ict with all its dynamics, trajectory and conﬂ ict transformation.
In May 2001 Macedonian Parliament, the highest legislative body, decided 
for the representatives of KLA, who were one side of the conﬂ ict, to be labeled by 
the term armed extremist groups38. However, even nowadays, the Macedonian 
side still uses the term terrorists. This was also admitted by the spokesperson 
of the majority party in the Parliament, VMRO-DPMNE, Igor Gievski:39
“I wish to say in front of Macedonian public opinion that these people 
are terrorists to us and nothing more. There are no armed groups or other 
terms, which our party will refer to as such. There will be no negotiations 
with them and there will be a rough offensive against these armed terrorist 
groups, to their destruction and total elimination.” 
Also, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ljube Boshkovski40 used to call extre-
mist armed groups as terrorists:
36 Mcquail, Denis (1992), Media Performance: Mass Communication and the Public Inter-
est. London: Sage Publication, p. 144.
37 Habermas, Jurgen, (1995), The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. An In-
quiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society, Cambridge Mass: The MIT Press.
38 Kostova, Jadranka ((2003), “Nezavrπen mir”, Skopje: Bata pres, str. 54.
39 Ibid.
40 TV Show “Vo centar” , Kanal 5.
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“… I think we had 11 days to withdraw the terrorists…” 
To continue, we will bring declarations of different important persons, direct 
actors in the armed conﬂ ict in Macedonia 2001. Actually, based on the exam-
ples below, we see that inadequate terminology used by politicians and public 
persons in decision-making, used during the conﬂ ict of 2001, caused confusion 
in mass communication and the mass media, Macedonian and Albanian. 
The declarations below were given in two mass media: TV Kanal 5, docu-
mentary “Vo centar” (in the center), and the Albanian newspaper Lajm, in the 
script “The dossier “. Both mass media communicate declarations of different 
protagonists and their expressive originality. 
Let us see in detail:
Heins Jorg Eiff (NATO ofﬁ cial) says regarding the conﬂ ict in Macedonia:
“Those pictures of American soldiers being put in NLA’s busses, therefore 
they were not spies…”41
In this case, the term NLA is used. Based on this declaration, the armed 
groups of Albanians in Macedonia are called by Mr. Eiff by their real name (the 
way this armed group called itself in the conﬂ ict of 2001) National Liberation 
Army.42 
Ex-Prime Minister L. Georgievski at the beginning of the 2001 conﬂ ict 
declares: “...according to their information (Serbian Secret Services) there 
will be an uprising in Macedonia. They let us know some villages where the 
uprising will take place.” 
In the same show for the same matter the ex-Prime Minister Georgievski 
says: 
“There were special vehicles that withdrew the terrorists from Haraci-
na.43 
Robert Frowick, (Special Ambassador of OSCE in Macedonia during 2001) 
refers to the term “conﬂ ict”: 
“I talked regarding the unchangeable solution of this conﬂ icting situation 
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Peter Feith (Special Negotiator of NATO-and NLA), in a declaration about 
the armed formation of NLA says:
“There were around 300 warriors that needed to withdraw…”45
In this case Mr. Feith does not use the term terrorists. In another case he 
says: “In reality the conﬂ ict of 2001 in Macedonia did not have losers”. 
Based on this declaration in Macedonia there were two “sides” in the conﬂ ict.
Also, Mr. Feith in the same show (Vo centar) declares:
 “Lord Robertson said that it would take 20 thousand NATO soldiers to 
control a possible civil war in Macedonia.”46
In this case Lord Robertson uses the term war. 
Sllobodan Cashule: The conﬂ ict in Macedonia took place in a region that 
coincides with contraband passage, the so-called 8th corridor of international 
organized crime.47
George Robertson (ex-Secretary General of NATO) in the show “Vo Centar” 
and the newspaper Lajm says:
“Their activity (NLA) was criminal and this is NATO’s position.” Later in the 
same show he declared “I have already said that the uprisers took Haracina 
faster than you could spell the village’s name. It was too fast and by accident, 
since neither uprisers nor Macedonian forces wanted to ﬁ ght in Haracina”48
General Pande Petrovski (ARM) declares: ... in Tanushë there were 20-26 
terrorists who came from abroad and for one month there were discussions 
whether the army should have solved the problem.49 
Vllado Popovski (Professor at the University of Saint Kiril and Metodij 
-Skopje) declares on the conﬂ ict of 2001 in Macedonia:
... The crisis in Macedonia started with 26 and ended with 2200-2600 
armed persons of NLA.50
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Lubomir Frckovski (Professor at Saint Kiril-Skopje):
“…last two or three days there were attempts where negotiations for guer-
rillas’ relocation were done…”51
Lube Boshkovski (ex-Minister of the Interior of RM):
The village Haracina was surrounded. Terrorists did not have water or food. 
Terrorists could stay in the village for two or three days…. To act united for 
disruption of terrorist bands in Haracina.52 
In this show, its author V. Eftov refers to the Albanian armed groups as the 
National Liberation Army. During talks he declares that the “members of NLA 
were locked in basements and aimed to…”53
 Vllado Buçkovski (ex-Minister of Defence in RM): 
“This would be convenient for the group of Commander Hoxha and all 
members of NLA in Haracina, and this was proved since their victims’ 
number was minimal.”54
In this declaration, the ex-Minister of Defence, who led the Macedonian 
army during the conﬂ ict, uses the term NLA. 
Arben Xhaferri (leader of DPA):
“When a war starts according to political theories then big territorial issues 
come to the play. Wars do not take place for human rights but for political 
rights.”55
Ali Ahmeti (political director of the general headquarters of NLA) says:
“We made a just war for rights of Albanians in Macedonia. We didn’t have 
a war for territories and not even against Macedonian people. We were a 
disciplined national army; we fought for national and human rights.”56
After an attentive observation of the political-military terminology by pro-
tagonists, we come to the conclusion that all participants in this conﬂ ict, based 
on their declarations for public opinion, have different versions of an objective 
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confusion is carried out in all the mass media in Macedonia, Albanian or Ma-
cedonian. Almost every media at the time had its own terminology reality to 
reﬂ ect objective reality of the events in RM.
Most used/misused notions at that time are: Armed war; Armed conﬂ ict; 
Interethnic conﬂ ict; Terrorism: Extremism; Terrorism of state, Conﬂ ict of parties’ 
interests; Cultural conﬂ ict, National war, Human rights war, Nationalism …
Based on this empirical-theoretical analysis of the terminology use we come 
to the conclusion that the actors of the 2001 conﬂ ict in Macedonia used ina-
dequate terminology to reﬂ ect objective reality.
The actors of the conﬂ ict and the media representatives did not respect the 
language-terminology meaning of objective events. Maybe this is the rationale 
of why today, ﬁ ve years later, there is no scientiﬁ c deﬁ nition of what really 
happened in Macedonia in 2001.
 This terminology confusion caused for the public opinion in Macedonia, 
the intellectual and political elite, to ask the question up to this day: what 
happened in Macedonia during the conﬂ ict of 2001?
Macedonia is experiencing Galtung’s post-transformation conﬂ ict, and is 
still not lucid about the events of 2001. When a common consensus on the 
2001 events is reached, only then the basis of new post-conﬂ ict society will be 
set; free of homophobic chains, intolerance and frustrations. 
Inadequate political terminology used by different politicians and the mass 
media, as a message carrier of human communication, caused a subjective confu-
sion from an objective circumstance, such as the armed conﬂ ict between the Ma-
cedonian government forces and members of the National Liberation Army.
It is uncontestable by all that Macedonia in 2001 experienced a CONFLICT. 
Based on many deﬁ nitions of conﬂ ict, we come to the conclusion that Mace-
donia experienced an ARMED CONFLICT. Other attributions to this conﬂ ict 
will remain the question of analysis and terminology confusion. 
The main aim of this paper is to offer another possibility in deﬁ ning the 
notion of conﬂ ict, in regard to the events of 2001 in Macedonia, seen from the 
theoretical- scientiﬁ c point of view in the use of terms and misuse of others, 
for needs of public opinion reﬂ ected through the mass media. 
CONCLUSION 
Even after this theoretical aspect and empirical interpretation of terminology 
regarding the conﬂ ict of 2001, everything remains unclear, and the question 
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“what happened with the armed conﬂ ict in Macedonia in 2001?” is still being 
asked.
Although ﬁ ve years have passed, the deﬁ nition of the armed conﬂ ict in 
Macedonia in 2001 is still pending. 
Political juridical terminology used by the actors of these events is absolutely 
incompatible and opposed by three participants in the conﬂ ict: military-police 
forces of Macedonia, the NLA and the international factor. 
All these terms and concepts have caused confusion regarding their inter-
pretation and communication in the mass media. It is a fact that disrespect for 
political juridical terms in the empirical sphere of communication has caused 
a subjective interpretation of objective events and circumstances in the armed 
conﬂ ict of 2001. 
In 2001 in Macedonia an armed conﬂ ict between armed groups and gover-
nmental police forces took place. The question that poses itself at this stage 
is - did we have an ethnic conﬂ ict or an ethnic war? Was there a geo-strategic 
clash in this conﬂ ict? Did we witness terrorism towards the state or the state 
terrorism in this conﬂ ict? Did this conﬂ ict illustrate to us that we had a civil 
war? Was terminology of a “war for human rights” used in this conﬂ ict? 





SUKOB KAO DRU©TVENO-POLITI»KI POJAM
»ak i nakon teorijskog vida i empirijskog tumaËenja terminologije koja se odnosi 
na sukob 2001., sve ostaje nejasno, a pitanje “©to se dogodilo s oruæanim sukobom u 
Makedoniji 2001?” joπ se uvijek postavlja. 
Premda je proπlo pet godina, deﬁ nicija oruæanog sukoba u Makedoniji 2001. joπ 
uvijek nije konaËna. 
* Dr. sc. Ymer Ismaili, docent Juænoeuropskog sveuËiliπta, Ilindenska p.n., 1200 Tetovo
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PolitiËka pravna terminologija kojom se  koriste akteri tih dogaaja potpuno je nepri-
mjerena i protivna trima sudionicima u sukobu: vojno-policijskim snagama Makedonije, 
NOA i meunarodnom Ëimbeniku.
Svi ti termini i koncepti uzrokovali su zbrku u njihovu tumaËenju i komunikaciji 
u masovnim medijima. »injenica je da je nepoπtovanje politiËkih pravnih termina u 
empirijskoj sferi komunikacije dovelo do subjektivnog tumaËenja objektivnih dogaaja i 
okolnosti u oruæanom sukobu 2001. 
U Makedoniji se 2001. dogodio oruæani sukob izmeu naoruæanih skupina i dræavne 
policije. Pitanje koje se postavlja u ovoj je fazi jesmo li imali etniËki sukob ili etniËki rat. 
Je li postojao geo-strateπki sraz u tom sukobu? Pokazuje li nam taj sukob da smo imali 
graanski rat? Je li terminologija “rata za ljudska prava” koriπtena u tom sukobu?
Sva ta pitanja i mnoga druga joπ uvijek traæe znanstvene i empirijske odgovore. 
KljuËne rijeËi: sukob (nasilan - nenasilan), sukob kao proces, politiËki sustav, rat, 
kriza, nasilje, etniËki sukob, ekstremizam
Zusammenfassung
Ymer Ismaili **
DER KONFLIKT ALS GESELLSCHAFTSPOLITISCHER BEGRIFF
Auch nach dem theoretischen Aspekt und der empirischen Auslegung der Terminolo-
gie, die sich auf den Konﬂ ikt von 2001 bezieht, bleibt alles unklar, und die Frage, was 
mit dem bewaffneten Konﬂ ikt 2001 in Makedonien passierte, wird immer noch gestellt. 
Obwohl fünf Jahre vergangen sind, steht die Deﬁ nition des bewaffneten Konﬂ ikts im 
Jahre 2001 in Makedonien immer noch nicht endgültig fest.
Die politische Rechtsterminologie, die von den Akteuren der Ereignisse verwendet wird, 
ist völlig unangemessen und entspricht nicht den drei beteiligten Seiten im Konﬂ ikt, den 
Militär- und Polizeikräften Makedoniens, der NOA und dem internationalen Faktor. All 
die Termine und Konzepte haben Verwirrung in ihrer Auslegung und der Kommunikation 
in den Massenmedien verursacht. Es ist eine Tatsache, dass die Missachtung politischer 
Rechtstermine in der empirischen Kommunikationssphäre zur subjektiven Auslegung 
objektiver Ereignisse und Umstände des bewaffneten Konﬂ ikts von 2001 führte.
**  Dr. Ymer Ismaili, Dozent an der Südosteuropa-Universität Tetovo, Ilindenska p. n., 
1200 Tetovo
Zbornik PFZ, 57, (2) 381-403 (2007) 403
In Makedonien kam es im Jahre 2001 zu einem bewaffneten Konﬂ ikt zwischen 
bewaffneten Gruppen und der Staatspolizei. Die Frage, die sich in dieser Phase stellt, 
ist - hatten wir einen ethnischen Konﬂ ikt oder einen ethnischen Krieg? Ist es in diesem 
Konﬂ ikt zu einem geostrategischen Zusammenstoß gekommen? Zeigt uns dieser Konﬂ ikt, 
dass wir einen Bürgerkrieg hatten? Wurde die Terminologie “Krieg für Menschenrechte” 
in diesem Konﬂ ikt benutzt? 
All diese und viele andere Fragen verlangen noch immer nach wissenschaftlichen und 
empirischen Antworten.
Schlüsselwörter: Konﬂ ikt (gewalttätiger - gewaltloser), Konﬂ ikt als Prozess, politisches 
System, Krieg, Krise, Gewalt, ethnischer Konﬂ ikt, Extremismus, Auﬂ ehnung
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